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International Securities Regulation-
Absorption of the Shock
As with so many other facets of our economic and social life, the securities
industry has undergone and continues to undergo its own form of "future
shock." The internationalization of the world's securities markets is a phenom-
enon of the past 15 years. While rarely consistent, the dynamics of that
movement have kept a pace with which not even the most modern and flexible
laws and institutions could hope to cope effectively. Even the United States,
with the most comprehensive regulatory scheme in the world, has been kept at
bay in massive international securities frauds and at the same time criticized
for an overzealous extra-territorial application of its laws. Other countries have
adopted or strengthened securities laws and regulations, providing an unprec-
edented potential for uncertainty, conflict and inconsistency for those enter-
prises which would venture to tap the world's capital markets. Technological
advances, primarily in transportation and communication, the growth of the
multinational enterprise (MNE) and a number of related factors, such as the
rapid internationalization of money and capital markets, have provided the
environment for offshore securities frauds and have caused a myriad of complex
neuroses. One such neurosis is that the world soon will be controlled by the
MNEs. The rise of many developing nations and a concomitant surge of
nationalism indicate that the MNE may not be entirely the master of its own or
our destiny.I
Regardless of the role of the MNE, each country and each person and enter-
prise are part of an international world where no one, including the United
States, can revert successfully to an isolationist role. The book value of United
States investment abroad is well in excess of one hundred billion dollars and
foreign investment in the United States, attracted at least in part by the
decreased international value of the dollar, has increased significantly in recent
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years. The answer to the breakdown of national boundaries does not rest with
restrictive measures limiting the foreign ownership of local enterprise, such as
have been adopted in many developing nations.2 Rather, the answer lies in
increased communication, understanding and occupation in a number of areas
which transcend national boundaries, such as antitrust, export and import
controls, and securities regulation. With respect to securities, effective regula-
tion is needed which can reach all transactions when participants are in need of
protection, regardless of where the transaction occurs, yet which will be mindful
of differences in attitude and approach in different countries which potentially
render compliance by MNEs expensive, time-consuming and frustrating.
If this is the goal for international securities regulation, it makes little dif-
ference whether it is achieved through the immediate establishment of a supra-
national body or through accommodation and flexibility on a national level with
respect to disclosure and reporting and a judicious extra-territorial application
of national laws with respect to enforcement. Perhaps a beginning would be an
international body composed of representatives from public and private insti-
tutions concerned with securities transactions and their regulation. While the
ultimate goal of this body might be to develop a framework for the regulation of
international transactions by qualifying MNEs, in effect preempting national
regulation of these transactions, the more immediate and attainable goal should
be the development of exemptions within national regulatory schemes for
international transactions where the issuer is subject to "effective regulation" in
its domicile. There is abundant precedent for such an approach, perhaps the
most striking example being the "blue sky" laws of the various states. Almost
all states exercise jurisdiction over an initial public offering within their borders,
regardless of the domicile of the issuer. Once the securities of an issuer are listed
on a major national securities exchange, however, most states exempt further
offerings within their boundaries in reliance on the regulatory surveillance of the
exchange and the SEC.3
This article will summarize the status of securities regulation throughout the
industrialized world and examine its application to transactions which cross
national boundaries, and, with this foundation, will explore what has been and
can be done to secure effective international regulation without impeding the
free flow of capital.
'Such measures are part of the Andean Investment Code and have been adopted in a number of
other South American countries. Similar restrictive legislation has been before Congress. There is
some question whether such restrictions could withstand constitutional attack in the United States.
See Fenton, Proposed Limitations on Alien Purchases of United States Securities, 9 J. INT. LAW &
EcoN. 267 (1974).
'When securities are listed on an exchange, they must also be registered under Section 12(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, thereby subjecting the issuer to the periodic reporting, proxy
solicitation and insider trading rules of this Act.
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Securities Regulation in General
Despite the emergence of the institutional investor and its impact in the
marketplace, the United States remains committed to a system of regulation
where individuals can invest with some degree of protection against abusive
practices. The primary ingredients of this system are (1) the comprehensive
requirements for disclosure (a) when a firm makes an appeal to the public
market for funds and (b) periodically thereafter in order to ensure an effective
secondary trading market, and (2) the public and private remedies when in-
adequate disclosure attends a securities transaction.
In most other parts of the industrialized world, regulation of securities
markets and firms issuing securities has developed on different premises. In
Europe, the truly "public" company has been a rarity; capital markets have
operated on a different basis, with banks (prohibited from engaging in the
securities business in the United States by the Glass-Steagall Act 4) playing a
predominant role in the purchase and distributionof securities; most securities
are in bearer form so that ownership is difficult to trace; and an over-the-
counter market, so well developed in the United States, does not exist. These are
but a few of the many differences. Indeed, investing and trading in securi-
ties, particularly common stocks, have been regarded in Europe as an economic
function of a tightly knit and restricted business community where those
individuals who participate can make independent, informed judgments. The
European traditions of family-controlled companies and "secrecy" have
allowed, even required, that data be transmitted informally in a way not
possible in the anonymity of the American economy. European businessmen
have viewed "disclosure" as an unfair aid to their competitors. In fairness to
this view, until a greater degree of uniformity in regulation is achieved in
countries in close proximity to each other, firms in those countries will not be
able to take comfort in the fact that their competitors are subject to the same or
similar requirements.
While the differences in attitude and approach to securities regulation are
thus natural and understandable, they tend to frustrate the hope for interna-
tional accord leading to international regulation on anything other than a lowest
common denominator basis. Nonetheless, the past ten years have witnessed vast
increases in the scope and sophistication of securities laws in countries other
than the United States. As this process continues, the differences in attitude
and approach should dissipate. Those which remain as real will be crystalized
and become proper subjects for international discourse.
'12 U.S.C.A. § 24.
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Securities Regulation In the United States
The Basic Regulatory Scheme
The primary foundations of the federal securities laws are the Securities Act
of 19331 (the "1933 Act"), the Securities Exchange Act of 19346 (the "1934
Act") and the Investment Company Act of 19407 (the "1940 Act"). In brief, the
1933 Act requires disclosure in connection with the public offer and sale of
securities and provides administrative and private remedies for failure to
disclose and for material inaccuracies in disclosure; the 1934 Act regulates
brokers and dealers, contains requirements with respect to periodic reporting,
solicitation of proxies and insider trading, and provides for the now omni-
present private remedy of"10b-S" when "fraud" attends the purchase or sale of
a security'; and the 1940 Act regulates certain operations of collective invest-
ment institutions, commonly known in the United States as mutual funds. The
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), which administers all aspects of
the federal securities laws, has embellished these statutes with regulations and
other pronouncements which together form a regulatory framework well beyond
that of any other country.
Extra-territorial Application of the
United States Securities Laws
For the most part, the federal securities laws apply equally to foreign and
domestic firms desiring to offer securities within the United States. For the non-
United States firm, this has created many conflicts with laws and practices in its
home country, particularly in the areas of accounting and financial reporting.
In particular, it is usually burdensome for a foreign firm, once having sold its
securities in the United States, to be required to comply to the same extent as
domestic firms with the reporting, proxy solicitation and insider trading
requirements of the 1934 Act. This burden on foreign firms unfamiliar with
such regulation and the conflict with laws and mores of other countries led to an
international outcry when the 1964 amendments to the 1934 Act rendered these
requirements applicable to foreign issuers with a certain number of United
States shareholders. International discourse and fact-gathering by the SEC led
to the granting of exemptions which softened the impact on foreign firms and
demonstrated that the SEC could accommodate its interest in protecting
American investors and securities markets to the exigencies of international
commerce. The final result was the adoption of Rule 3a12-3, which exempts the
securities of foreign issuers from Sections 14 and 16 of the 1934 Act even though
s48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa.
'48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a-78hh.
'15 U.S.C.A., §§ 80a-1 to -52.
'Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.
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the securities are registered under Section 12 (g), provided that less than 50
percent of the voting stock of the issuer is held of record by United States
residents. With respect to periodic reporting requirements, the SEC has
required most foreign issuers to submit only that information which they must
make public under the laws of their domicile or the regulations of stock
exchanges on which their securities are listed. There are numerous other
examples where the SEC, acting on ad hoc basis, has permitted foreign issuers
desiring to offer securities in the United States to deviate from United States
standards, particularly in the accounting area.9
There are also examples of accommodations of the federal securities laws with
respect to domestic issuers offering securities outside the United States. Even
with the repeal of the Interest Equalization Tax, the SEC has allowed United
States issuers (other than mutual funds) to make foreign offerings without
registration where reasonable steps were taken to ensure that the securities
would not be sold to citizens or residents of the United States and would come to
rest outside the United States. To assist domestic companies in complying with
Japanese requirements, the SEC adopted Rule 434C under the 1933 Act.
Japanese regulation requires some additional information in the prospectus and
a different format of presentation than is required by the 1933 Act, and Rule
434C permits the use of a prospectus for the Japanese market so long as it is not
provided to United States nationals or residents.
Requirements as to disclosure which constitute a condition precedent to
offering securities in a given jurisdiction and continuing regulation thereafter
are certainly the topics of critical concern to MNEs and all others who
participate in the world's capital markets. Nonetheless, most of the focus of
scholars has been on the extension to international settings of the private
remedy afforded by Rule l0b-5.10 While the 1934 Act and the SEC have
provided no parameters for the transnational reach of Rule l0b-5, the courts
have clarified the essential elements to jurisdiction and for the most part have
done so without offending the sense of justice in other interested countries.
When a security traded on a United States exchange is involved in a "fraud-
'For a number of such cases, see INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION 1975, Practicing Law
Institute, pages 200-213.
10A discussion of cases involving the extra-territorial reach of lOb-5 and the various bases in
international law for asserting extra-territorial jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this article. These
subjects have been examined in a number of recent articles, including Comment, The Transnational
Reach ofRule lOb-5, 121 UNIv. PA. LAW REv. 1363 (1973); Comment Extra-territorial Applicaton
of the Securities Acts, 1974 WASH. UNIV. LAw Q. 859; Mizrack, Recent Developments in the Extra-
territorial Application of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 30 Bus. LAw.
367 (1975). Some of the leading cases discussed in these articles are Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972), Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973), Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,
417 U.S. 506 (1974), Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (1975), and ITT v. Vencap,
Ltd., and Blackman, 519 F.2d 1001 (1975).
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ulent" transaction and there is an adverse effect on a United States interest,
there probably will be jurisdiction based on the Schoenbaum case even though
the actionable conduct occurred entirely outside the United States.II If there is
substantial conduct within the United States forming an "essential link" with a
total scheme to defraud, together with a harmful effect on a United States
interest, there will be jurisdiction under Leascol2 and cases following, even if
listing on a United States exchange is absent. Standards such as these, while by
no means precise, should not provide a stumbling block to the vast majority of
MNEs, especially in the light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Scherk"3 , which recognizes that arbitration and venue selection bring orderli-
ness and predictability to international transactions and avoid conflict of laws
problems when courts of several countries might otherwise attempt to exercise
jurisdiction over such transactions."
Certainly enforcement and private remedies are important in a discussion of
international securities regulation. On the other hand, the cases which have
been decided and have received such notoriety in the past several years highlight
securities frauds; these, however, comprise but a small segment of international
securities transactions. There is little question that MNEs have learned that
remedies exist for inadequate disclosure in the sale of securities. What is
needed, however, is a means for MNEs to tap the capital markets of more than
one country without being subjected to conflicting and burdensome regulation,
resulting in delays and exorbitant costs which are paid for in the long run by the
MNE's shareholders.
Accommodation of United States Securities Laws
to Transactions with Foreign Elements
It is unlikely that meaningful international securities regulation administered
by a central body and subscribed to by a majority of nations will be achieved in
the 1970s. Nonetheless, this is a logical if not mandatory outgrowth of the
direction currently being taken by the world's capital markets and their
participants. The questions are the traditional ones of when, how and on what
basis. In the interim, and as an important part of the road toward uniformity
and centralization, there must be some reasonable accommodation of domestic
securities laws when they conflict with legitimate laws and practices of other
countries and when rigid application is not necessary for the protection of le-
gitimate domestic interests.
I'Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, supra note 10.
"Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, supra note 10.
'
3Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., supra note 10.
'See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1971), holding that forum selection clauses in
international contracts are prima facie valid.
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Domestic laws have had little opportunity to catch up with the rapid inter-
nationalization of securities transactions and the world securities markets. They
thus remain concerned primarily with domestic markets and the parochial
interests of local citizens and residents. The words of the Supreme Court in
Bremen v. Zapata apply not only to the United States but to each country which
would participate in the modern world economy:
The expansion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if,
notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes
must be resolved under our laws and in our courts .... We cannot have trade and
commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms,
governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.'"
The 1933 and 1934 Acts do not differentiate between foreign and domestic
private issuers and accountants, yet insistence on strict compliance with United
States laws and regulations would effectively deny many foreign issuers access to
United States capital markets. Despite the spread of major United States based
auditing firms as the MNEs of the accounting profession, there remains much
lack of uniformity in different countries on accounting principles and proce-
dures and financial statement presentation and disclosure. A full discussion of
accounting differences is beyond the scope of this article but brief reference to
the nature of these differences may bring some appreciation of the task which
lies ahead. In some industrialized countries, consolidated financial statements
are not the accepted method of financial reporting; inventory is carried at
replacement or current value and arbitrary write-downs are permitted (note that
the recent change in the United States to the use of LIFO in valuing inventory is
a step toward replacement value accounting); depreciation is continued even
after the asset has been fully depreciated for book purposes so long as it is still
usable; fixed assets can be written up to current values, often on the basis of a
coefficient established by the home government; contingency reserves unknown
in the United States are allowed or required; and confirmation of accounts
receivable and observation of physical inventories are not normal auditing
procedures. Independence of accountants, a highly sensitive issue in the United
States, can be a problem for companies in some foreign countries where
accountants are expected to own shares of their clients' stock.
Several examples of flexibility by the SEC in the application of the federal
securities laws have been cited above. The United States has not always been so
successful, however. Rights offerings to existing shareholders must be regis-
tered under the 1933 Act but are subject to little or no regulation in most
countries. There have been numerous rights offerings by United Kingdom
companies, notably the Rank Organization, where the companies refused to
cope with the time-consuming and costly registration process and restricted the
"Id. at 8-9.
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offerings to shareholders not resident in North America. The result was not
protection of United States shareholders, but rather financial loss to those
shareholders, because they could not participate in a favorable offering.
Despite statutory authorization permitting foreign investment companies to
register under the 1940 Act,16 only a few have registered. In fact, the SEC has
registered foreign investment companies only if it considered that the 1940 Act
could be enforced against the foreign company both from a legal and practical
point of view. In this regard, the SEC has not shown any propensity to follow the
German example of adopting a set of standards to govern foreign investment
companies more lenient than those with which domestic companies must
comply. The obvious fear of such a dual standard is that domestic companies
will reincorporate in a country where investment companies are subject to little
or no regulation in an effort to take advantage of the more lenient standards
applicable to foreign companies.
Indeed, the answer is not a dual standard system; rather, pending true inter-
national regulation, each situation can be examined on an ad hoc basis to
determine whether certain aspects of the United States securities laws and
regulations should be accommodated to legitimate conflicts affecting the
foreign issuer. Major considerations in analyzing each case should be the scope
and degree of regulation in the issuer's home country as well as the true owner-
ship and locus of control of the issuer. If a foreign issuer is domiciled in a
country with no effective regulation, then there would be no legitimate conflict
among national laws, and countries in which the securities of such a foreign
issuer are sold should exercise the control and regulation lacking in the issuer's
home country. In such a case, uniformity and harmonization may be less
important than some form of effective regulation. While the possibility exists
that a foreign issuer will thus be subjected to different regulations in different
countries where it desires to offer its securities, these are conflicts which can be
resolved only as we approach a structure for supranational regulation.
The enforcement of public and private remedies does not present the same
potential for conflict as do disclosure and reporting requirements. While un-
harnessed extra-territorial application of those remedies is certain to create
international ill will, the availability of a meaningful remedy to an injured
investor who otherwise may have no opportunity for redress is critical to the
maintenance of an orderly securities market and investor confidence and is
unlikely to offend international comity. In deciding whether to give extra-
territorial application to Rule lOb-5 and other remedies available under the
United States securities laws, the courts have considered a number of factors in
addition to the underlying purposes of the United States securities laws, the
most important of which are the impact of the transaction on United States and
1615 U.S.C. § 80a-7(d) (1970).
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 10, No. 4
International Securities Regulation 643
foreign securities markets, the legitimate expectations of the parties and the
need for certainty and predictability in business transactions, the nature and
extent of domestic conduct and effect, and the relevant policies of other
interested countries and the relative interests of those countries in the deter-
mination of the particular issue."7 The last factor, of course, is of utmost
importance when there is another interested jurisdiction, i.e., one in which
some significant part of the transaction occurred, where a market for the
securities is located, or where the issuer or some party to the transaction is
domiciled.
It is doubtful that many have been offended by the extra-territorial applica-
tion of remedies under the United States securities laws in situations where the
United States was an interested jurisdiction and where there was not a
bargained-for arbitration or choice of law clause. Certainly MNEs based in
other countries have not been affected significantly. Although Rule 10b-5
differs from the concepts of fraud in most other countries in that the standards
of conduct are higher and the requirements of proof somewhat easier under
lOb-5, the differences probably are not so substantial that the application of
Rule lOb-5 in most international securities transactions would offend or conflict
with foreign policies and laws. Nonetheless, there may be instances where the
existence of remedies under the laws of interested foreign countries would
support a United States court's deferral to a proceeding brought in a court of
that foreign country. The goals of sound transnational securities markets and
harmonious international relations require that United States courts not be
overzealous in extending the protection of United States laws to cases in which
some meaningful protection is available under applicable foreign law nor
reticent in extending the protection of United States laws to cases in which no
adequate alternative protection or remedy exists. The collapse of the IOS
companies illustrates the harms which can occur when the SEC and United
States courts refuse to fill a regulatory vacuum that works to the detriment of
foreign investors.
While remedies for fraud are universally recognized, the United States
securities laws provide at least one remedy which is neither recognized nor
understood in most countries. Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, which authorizes
recovery by a corporation of any profit made by an insider on the purchase and
sale of shares within six months, is based on absolute liability. Such a remedy
should be applied cautiously, if at all, in international settings"8 and should not
'
TWany of these considerations are not dissimilar to those outlined in the Restatement (Second)
Conflicts, § 6(2).
"See Wagmein v. Astle, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP., 94,783 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (no recovery under
16(b)); but see, Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968) (recovery allowed under
16(b)). Article 82 of the Statute on European Stock Companies, proposed by the EEC Commission
in 1970, is similar to Sections 16(a) and (b) of the 1934 Act. Also, in 1970 the German Commission
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burden international discourse and efforts at harmonization on other issues
which are far more relevant to the effort of fostering international securities
transactions while preserving the integrity of domestic regulation.
The real effort at harmonization is needed less in the area of enforcement
than in disclosure and other requirements that are conditions precedent to
entering or remaining in a given domestic capital market. Yet even Tentative
Draft No. 3 of the Federal Securities Code' 9 fails to address the real issue.
Section 1604, entitled "Relation to Other Countries," provides that the code
applies to sales, purchases, offers, inducements, proxy solicitations or tender
offers occurring within the United States although initiated outside that
country; simply an attempt at statutory formulation of one of the rules of inter-
national law with respect to the extra-territorial application of domestic law.
The emphasis appears to be a codification of some of the elements of the Leasco
and Schoenbaum cases; again, these are remedies rather than requirements for
entry. The draft gives some hint on the latter point by providing that the code
does not apply to sales or offers initiated in the United States but directed
abroad. Left unanswered is the situation of the MNE desiring to raise capital in
several foreign capital markets; it is relieved from regulation at home but po-
tentially is subject to conflicting and duplicative regulation in those countries
where its securities are offered.
Securities Regulation Outside the United States
As noted at the outset, the capital markets and their participants in most
parts of the world are different from the United States situation. The rapid
internationalization of these markets has tended to narrow the gap, but new
markets are continually emerging and important differences remain. These
must be understood and reconciled if international securities regulation is to
proceed on a basis which will satisfy the needs of MNEs and the world business
community.
In general, securities regulation in Europe and other industrialized countries
is much less developed than in the United States, primarily because it has
responded to capital markets with a different structure and different par-
ticipants. Offerings in Europe of equity securities in what would be a public
distribution by United States standards have never been and are not now
common. Aside from the great difference between "private" offerings in Europe
and the United States, little additional access to the public in Europe wbuld be
gained through the true "public" offering. Domestic exchange control restric-
of Stock Exchange Experts recommended that all listed companies comply with certain voluntary
rules on inside trading.
"AMERICAN LAV INSTITUTE, FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, Tentative Draft No. 3 (April 1, i94),
§ 1604.
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tions often inhibit the purchase by individuals of foreign securities. For
instance, British residents cannot acquire non-sterling securities without Bank
of England approval and payment of the foreign currency investment premium,
twenty-five percent of which must be forfeited on resale. As a result, purchasers
in England usually are institutions which are exempt from the exchange control
restrictions and which may invest on behalf of non-residents and holders of
discretionary accounts. Furthermore, the prospectus requirements of the
Companies Act 1948 do not apply to an offer to any person whose ordinary
business is to buy or sell shares, whether as principal or agent: an additional
incentive to offer only to institutions. From the United States point of view, the
most vivid examples of the liberal private placement doctrines extant in most of
Europe have been the Eurobond and Eurocurrency offerings in recent years.
These offerings were certainly public by United States standards, but were
made by underwriters and dealers so as to comply with local private placement
standards in Europe.
We cannot hope for meaningful international securities regulation unless
those who would develop such regulation have a complete understanding and
appreciation of the regulatory differences, large and small, in the participating
nations. A detailed survey of the status of securities regulation throughout the
world is well beyond the scope of this article, but a few examples are necessary
to place in perspective the broader issues of how and on what basis to achieve
international regulation .
2 0
Some forms of securities regulation have existed for some time in several
European countries. Unlike the United States, however, there are usually not
separate securities laws. Prospectus requirements may be found in a companies
act or commercial code and remedies for fraud or deception are almost certain
to be found in the basic civil code. These requirements and remedies have not
developed to the same extent as in the United States for the simple reason that
there has been no need. Europeans have never traded in securities to any
appreciable degree and local business enterprises either did not require large
amounts of capital or obtained it through normal bank loans. The emergence of
MNEs and international capital markets, however, has disrupted these tradi-
tional structures, with the result that securities regulation outside the United
States has developed significantly in the past ten years.
Securities regulation in France really began in 1966 and the Commission des
Optrations de Bourse, which administers the French securities laws and super-
vises the French stock exchanges, was created only in 1967. French regulation
2
"For a detailed analysis of securities regulation in several countries, see International Securities
Project, 30 Bus. LAW 585 (1975). For a concise tabulation of the reporting, disclosure, insider
trading and proxy regulations of the major European exchanges, see INrERNATIONAL SECURITIES
REGULATION 1975, Practicing Law Institute, pages 160-165.
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nonetheless remains quite different from that in the United States, in large part
due to the practice and consensus of the French financial community. Witness
the distinction between public and private offerings: public offering in France
involves "public appeals for savings," a concept without further definition. The
verbally expressed position of the Ministry of Economy and Finance is that, if
no public advertisement appears prior to completion of the distribution, French
banks may be solicited as underwriters or selected dealers and they may in turn
place foreign securities abroad, in discretionary accounts or to fill unsolicited
orders. Secondary offerings are not regulated unless a listing of the securities is
involved, and rights offerings to shareholders in France are not deemed to
involve a public offering and accordingly no approval is required. As a guard
against potential misuse of inside information with most shares in bearer form,
insiders or listed companies now must put their shares in registered form or
deposit them with a bank.
Most significant to securities regulation in the United Kingdom are the extra-
legal requirements of The London Stock Exchange and The City Code on Take-
Overs and Mergers. Probably no other stock exchange outside the United States
has such comprehensive requirements, and the "tender offer" regulations are
among the most sophisticated in the world. On the other hand, there is little in
the way of statutory securities regulation. Inasmuch as there is no over-the-
counter market in the United Kingdom, however, a company desiring a public
market for its shares of necessity will be involved in a listing on The Stock
Exchange and thus will become subject to its rules. Among other requirements,
The Stock Exchange approves all proposed materials to be sent to shareholders,
the United Kingdom thus being one of the few countries with anything resem-
bling the proxy rules promulgated under the 1934 Act.
There is no central body in the Federal Republic of Germany which has
primary jurisdiction over the interpretation and enforcement of the various
provisions of West German law which deal with securities, and with the excep-
tion of mutual funds, West Germany has no comprehensive statute which
regulates the distribution of securities. A prospectus is required only in ,con-
nection with the sale of mutual fund shares or the listing of securities, and even
if the listing follows a public distribution of shares in Germany, the offering
generally will be completed before the listing prospectus is required to be
prepared. Civil liabilities are at the early stages of development, mergers and
tender offers are subject to little regulation, and reporting and disclosure
requirements are at a minimum level. On the other hand, there is a provision
similar to Section 13(d) of the 1934 Act which requires notification to a
company when a business enterprise acquires more than 25 percent of its capital
stock. Until the notice is given, the rights to vote and receive dividends are
suspended.
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With respect to mutual funds, West Germany does have a comprehensive
statute which regulates funds established in West Germany. In regulating
foreign mutual funds,"' however, West Germany rejected its own 1957 statute,
because its supervisory authority could not conduct the same examination of
quality to which the management and operations of domestic funds were
subjected and because adherence to its domestic statute might be burdensome
or impossible if it conflicted with the laws of the fund's home country. Thus,
while domestic funds are subject to a regulatory law in the true sense of the
word, foreign funds are governed by a statute which more closely resembles a
disclosure law.
Unlike the European countries, Japan does have a separate securities law. In
fact, regulation in Japan is modeled after that in the United States, and the
fundamental law, the Securities Exchange Law of 1948, is patterned on the 1933
Act and the 1934 Act and regulates both the issuing and trading markets. The
Ministry of Finance has broad rule-making powers for the implementation of
the securities regulation policy, but little judicial interpretation exists due to the
Japanese reluctance to engage in litigation. In 1970, the internationalization of
the previously insulated Japanese securities market began, and the principal
recent developments in securities regulation have related to permitting
issuances of securities in Japan by foreign issuers and the listing of such
securities on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The similarities of regulation in Japan
and the United States should provide a strong base for accommodation and the
elimination of conflicting or duplicative requirements.
The need to accommodate domestic regulation to transactions with foreign
elements increases in direct proportion to the scope and extent of the domestic
regulation itself. The greater the regulation, the greater the potential for
conflict with laws and practices in a foreign issuer's home country. Companies
based in the United States have proved that they can tap European capital
markets with a minimum of regulation due to liberal private placement
doctrines and the operation of those markets themselves which renders it
unnecessary for the offer to be made directly to the "public." The same is not
true for companies based in Europe which would raise capital in the United
States. Thus, the burden of accommodation in a real sense rests with the SEC.
Nonetheless, the United States is not alone in the necessity to accommodate
domestic laws to foreign companies subject to conflicting regulation at home.
Possibly the most interesting example is presented by the West German statute
governing foreign investment companies. In general, this is significantly weaker
in regulatory impact than either the West German statute governing domestic
"For a complete discussion of the Foreign Investment Law, see Robson Jr., Regulating Foreign-
Based Institutions for Collective Investment: The German Statute, the American Experience, and
the OECD Standard Rules, 3 GA. JOUR. INT. & COMP. LAw 215 (1973).
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investment companies or the 1940 Act. Nonetheless, the West German statute
carries over the strong policy which exists in several European countries that
expert fiduciaries are better able to protect investors than investors themselves,
a basic difference from the attitude and regulatory approach in the United
States. The statute thus contains certain provisions with respect to the powers
and duties of custodian banks which are not found in the 1940 Act and which
are not customary practices of United States based mutual funds and invest-
ment companies. Nonetheless, West Germany has waived compliance with
these provisions in recognition that the security for investors which it finds in
the powers and duties of custodian banks can be supplied by the alternative
means of the total regulatory structure provided by the 1940 Act with respect to
registered investment companies.
In late 1973, the Tokyo Stock Exchange decided to permit the listing and
trading of certain foreign securities. Standards for listing were designed to
insure that only foreign-based MNEs and major "blue chip" corporations could
be listed and traded. At approximately the same time, two regulations on
requirements for financial statements of foreign companies were amended. The
first allows foreign companies to prepare financial statements for use in Japan
on the basis of the standards in their home country unless the Ministry of
Finance finds such standards to be inadequate. The second amendment allows
foreign companies to report on a consolidated or separate company basis
depending on how they regularly report their operations and those of their
subsidiaries in their home country. These are important examples of accom-
modation leading to a freer flow of capital without forsaking domestic regula-
tion.
Areas of International Cooperation
Cooperation on an international level in securities regulation and enforce-
ment is an essential adjunct to national restraint and accommodation and will
be an additional catalyst to the eventual development of some form of supra-
national regulation. Even with respect to enforcement of private remedies, the
judicial mechanism, whether in the United States or elsewhere, is not capable of
developing national securities policy or balancing the competing policies and
interests of different nations. Meaningful international study, discourse and
cooperation should not only harmonize standards that are in direct conflict but
also eliminate those which are ineffectual or unnecessary. It is important to
focus attention on the real differences of opinion as to the efficacy of alternative
methods of securities regulation and enforcement, and to do so on an empirical
rather than an intuitive basis.
Indeed, there is precedent for this form of international cooperation. The
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
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Arbitral Awards is adhered to not only by almost all countries of the Western
industrialized world but also by most of the Eastern European countries.
Officials of the antitrust agencies of almost all European countries, Canada,
Japan and the United States utilize the Business Practices Committee in the
OECD as a focal point for periodic meetings and exchange of views.
There has been progress as well in some areas of securities regulation. The
SEC has established an Office of International Corporate Finance, the duties of
which include supervising offerings of United States securities abroad and
offerings of foreign securities in the United States, and resolving the problems
which arise from the need to meet the accounting and disclosure requirements
of more than one nation. 2 Efforts are being made to standardize the regulation
of stock exchanges, and the EEC is attempting harmonization among the
Common Market countries in a number of areas related to securities regulation.
With respect to the difficult area of accounting principles and standards, in
1973 the International Accounting Standards Committee was formed by 31
professional accounting bodies from 22 countries. The task of this committee is
to formulate and publish basic standards and to promote worldwide acceptance
of those standards. International Accounting Standard No. 1 was issued in
January 1975 on the disclosure of accounting policies. Other standards have
been issued as exposure drafts or are on the agenda for future consideration,
including valuation of inventories, consolidation of financial statements, and
equity accounting, depreciation, and inflation accounting.
In the area of enforcement of securities laws, the best example of interna-
tional cooperation involves the myriad of Vesco-controlled corporations and
offshore funds." Significantly, in granting a preliminary injunction requested
by the SEC, the district court judge noted that related proceedings were being
carried on in several foreign countries and emphasized the importance of
working in harmony with the governmental authorities of those countries. Most
of the corporate defendants were domiciled in Canada, Luxembourg, the
Bahamas and the Netherlands Antilles. In mid-1973 there was a meeting in
Luxembourg attended by representatives of the SEC, the Luxembourg regula-
tory authorities, the Canadian federal government, and the Quebec and Ontario
Securities Commissions. The decision was made to seek the liquidation of the
IOS entities under the supervision of the domiciliary governments. What
emerged was real coordination of effort among the SEC, the United States
receivers, foreign governments and foreign liquidators. There have been quar-
terly meetings among all receivers and liquidators, and the courts and regula-
tory officials of the countries concerned have for the most part cooperated in
"Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9947 (Jan. 11, 1973).
"International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied 41 L.Ed.2d 236
(1974); see also HUTCHISON, VEsco, Praeger Publishers, Inc. (New York 1974).
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ceding jurisdiction and responsibility in a way to avoid conflict and duplication.
The lesson of Vesco is a persuasive argument for the creation of some form of
international securities commission to coordinate and supplement the efforts of
national regulatory agencies and courts in cases which involve several countries.
The existence of such a commission would enable interested countries to coor-
dinate their efforts quickly when speed is critical to preserve remaining liquid
assets.
The examples of cooperation cited above, while not to be belittled, fall far
short of the mark. To be realistic, however, modern history is replete with
failures of attempts at international regulation and agreement. Since World
War II, there have been any number of public and private attempts to establish
multinational conventions for the safeguarding of private foreign investments,
most of which aborted because of the divergent underlying interests of the
investing and receiving countries. 4 Proposals for a supranational authority to
administer an international companies law are not news,2" but again little has
been accomplished and recent nationalistic trends in the developing countries
have a twofold effect: they render the task of structuring an international
companies law even more difficult if not impossible, and they erode the
so-called dominant position of the MNEs which prompted many of the sugges-
tions for a supranational authority. As a result, MNEs now find themselves
subject to a myriad of restrictions in such countries, such as exchange controls
on dividend and royalty remittances, imposition of new and higher taxes on
earnings, and restrictions on the percentage of foreign ownership of local
companies. The difficulty of structuring an effective international companies
law perhaps is most vividly demonstrated by the experience of the EEC in its
attempts to formulate a company law for the members of the Community. The
concept was first proposed in 1960 and, although a draft statute has been pre-
pared, agreement has not been reached and the EEC now faces the task of
integrating British institutions and common law traditions within the frame-
work of civil law institutions and practices.
Certainly the development of an international companies law for the regula-
tion of MNEs is more difficult than the structuring of some form of interna-
tional securities regulation. Nonetheless, proposals for international coopera-
tion or regulation of a more limited scope than companies law have met with
considerable difficulty. Two examples are the attempts at harmonization of
standards, inspections and certifications with respect to the importation of
products" and the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Dis-
2
'Witness the ill-fated 1948 Havana Charter of the International Trade Organization.
2 Ball, Cosmocorp: The Importance of Being Stateless, 2 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 25 (Nov.-Dec.
1967).
'"Groetzinger, Jr., The New Gatt Code and the International Harmonization of Products
Standards, 8 CORN. IdrT. L. J. 168 (1974).
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putes, neither of which has been particularly successful. Nor have attempts been
much more successful in the securities field. The OECD Standard Rules with
respect to investment companies,27 although substantially adopted in Japan, are
the product of disagreement and compromise among the 23 member nations.
This inability to agree is the product of divergent attitudes toward the regulatory
role itself and a design of each member's representatives that their own
country's current regulatory scheme be able to meet the OECD Standard Rules
with minimal strain. Thus the forces of negotiation and compromise molded
the Standard Rules into a framework which is based upon the lowest common
denominator of acceptable regulation and falls far short of providing compre-
hensive regulation of investment companies.
The Future---Can It Absorb the Shock?
The design of a supranational structure for international securities regulation
is indeed a prodigious task. As noted earlier, at least until recently public share-
holders and active trading have been minor factors in the European securities
markets. There has thus been little pressure for public disclosure and other
developments which have occurred in the United States. To some extent, the
MNE caused the break-up of the traditional European family corporation and
increased the need to raise substantial amounts of equity to grow and compete
effectively. The experience of the United States and the United Kingdom in
creating investor confidence and attracting savings has persuaded many foreign
bankers and enterprises that disclosure and protection of investors are neces-
sary to the successful tapping of public funds.2" Nonetheless, most securities
markets and thus most systems of securities regulation continue to have basic
differences from those in the United States. Moreover, even in the United States
there is no consensus on all points. To the contrary, there is continuous re-
examination and change; witness the substantial amendments to the 1934 Act
in 1964, the "Wheat Report" and consequent changes, and the 1970 amend-
ments to the 1940 Act. With the increase in the number of MNEs and the
emergence of potential new capital markets, new systems of regulation are
under study almost everywhere and there are likely to be a myriad of viewpoints
and proposed solutions. It would seem critical to establish some form of inter-
national forum for disclosure before systems and viewpoints become cast in the
proverbial concrete. It is also important not to lose sight of the fact that a supra-
national regulatory scheme, at least at the outset, need cover only a small
portion of what is encompassed by total domestic regulation.
"Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Committee on Financial Markets,
Standard Rules for the Operation of Institutions for Collective Investment in Securities (1972).2
aFor a general discussion, see Cohen, International Securities Markets: Their Regulation, 46 ST.
JOHN'S LAw REV. 264 (1971).
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As usual, it is easier to agree on what should not be done, i.e., no country
should attempt, through unharnessed extra-territorial application of its own
laws, to impose a supranational regulatory structure on others, and it would be
equally wrong to regulate internationally on a lowest common denominator
basis. Similarly, it would be shortsighted to assume that the problem is only for
non-United States MNEs on the basis that United States MNEs are subject to
such a comprehensive regulatory scheme that they should be able to comply
elsewhere and, in any event, heretofore have been able to tap most foreign
capital markets by taking advantage of liberal private placement doctrines.
First, the past ten years have witnessed a tremendous growth in economic inter-
dependence, and the next ten years are likely to see the trend continue, possibly
with a multiplier effect. Therefore, it is important that non-United States based
MNEs be able to tap United States capital markets if this is necessary for them
to remain viable participants in a world economy where failure of any major
segment cannot help but impact the whole. Second, if the United States restricts
access to its capital markets, it is not unlikely that other nations will take steps
to control access by foreign-based MNEs. European investors cannot have for-
gotten the losses they sustained in convertible Eurobond offerings by United
States based MNEs and their Netherlands Antilles subsidiaries in the late 1960s
and early 1970s. In many cases, these securities have been repurchased by the
United States company for less than 50 percent of face amount.
Possibly the most important economic force over the next ten years will be the
result of MNEs and other companies increasing business activities with develop-
ing nations in the Middle East, Africa and South America. Here the problem is
twofold-nationalism is high and securities regulation is embryonic. Compa-
nies are thus faced with requirements that their subsidiaries have a local
majority and be financed locally, possibly through a stock issue rather than
bank loans. Unless some form of international cooperation is obtained, the
potential for conflicting and burdensome regulations is even greater than it has
been in recent years.
As noted earlier, there have been many examples of effective accommodation
and of international cooperation and efforts at harmonization of conflicting
laws and regulations. But aside from being inadequate to what is needed, these
efforts have been disjointed and could profitably be brought together in a forum
which would be designed to assemble securities scholars and experts from
around the world to discuss ideas and issues on a noncrisis basis. Especially with
the emergence of developing nations and thus new capital markets, an under-
standing of the workings of the various market systems and an appreciation of
the real problems in securities regulation are essential. Efforts thus could be
directed at those problems rather than being diverted to issues (such as a 16(b)
type absolute liability) where there may be great disagreement among nations
but where there is little impact on international securities transactions.
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Perhaps many countries could agree to the formation of an international
securities commission with a limited charter at first but the ability to expand
that charter through common accord as mutual understanding and respect
increased. Such a charter might include:
1. The forum, mentioned above, for international study and discourse and
coordination of the presently diffused efforts at cooperation and accom-
modation.
2. Coordination of enforcement efforts when international securities frauds
are uncovered and speed is necessary to find and preserve remaining
liquid assets. This aspect could be particularly important in view of the
difficulty, often encountered, of the courts of one country obtaining per-
sonal jurisdiction over potential defendants.
3. Examination of ways in which domestic regulation can be accommodated
to foreign issuers which are subject to meaningful regulation at home.
The problem, of course, is what constitutes "meaningful regulation."
The SEC is unlikely to relinquish jurisdiction when a non-United States
issuer enters the United States capital market in a manner which results
in a significant number of United States shareholders. Nonetheless,
United States mutual funds can sell securities in West Germany even
though United States regulations do not impose the duties on custodians
which are imposed under West German law. The SEC, possibly through
an international securities commission, should begin to examine modes of
regulation outside the United States which are sufficiently acceptable to
warrant exemption from United States requirements. For instance, any
company with securities listed on The Stock Exchange in London might
qualify for such an exemption so long as the company complied with all
requirements of the Exchange vis-a-vis its United States shareholders.
The long-term goal of such a commission should be the development of a
registration process for MNEs of sufficient size and with a proven earnings
history which desire to offer their securities. In the United States, there is some
precedent in the tests of eligibility for use of the simplified Form S-7 in lieu of
the more burdensome S-1. Perforce there will be difficulty in establishing the
tests of eligibility, the registration requirements and the degree of preemption
over national laws, particularly in the areas of enforcement and private
remedies. But one must begin somewhere, and the establishment of an inter-
national commission with a limited charter seems a reasonable first step likely
to attract enough participants to be an effective forum and eventually to provide
the foundation for true supranational regulation.
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